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Abstract
What can subjective reports of financial difficulties add to our under-
standing about the role of liquidity constraints in the demand for college
education? Liquidity constraints in education may lead to inefficient skill
allocations and perpetuate imbalances in the distribution of economic well-
being. Unfortunately, empirical evidence regarding their pervasiveness in
the U.S. has not been consistent in part because constraints tend to be in-
ferred indirectly. To evaluate how a potentially more direct measure can be
used to enhance our understanding of the issue, I focus on self-reports of fi-
nancial difficulties available in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. I
find that about 12 percent of college-age individuals expect to underinvest in
education because of financial limitations, which is an upper-bound estimate
of the fraction of liquidity-constrained students. While this paper shows that
subjective indicators of credit constraints are potentially noisy, they appear
to reveal important aspects of heterogeneity in the demand for education not
captured by the standard measures such as, e.g. parental income.
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1 Introduction
How important are liquidity constraints in the demand for college education in the
United States? What can subjective self-reports of financial limitations add to our
understanding of this phenomenon?
Credit constraints in education are potentially harmful to both efficiency
and equity. They lead to an inefficient allocation of resources and may work to
perpetuate and widen income inequality across generations. Substantial dispar-
ities in educational attainment by family socioeconomic status have been noted
in the literature.1 Given the sharp increase in education wage premiums over the
past thirty years, these disparities have worked to widen income gaps and increase
inequality.2 While theory suggests that government intervention can help elimi-
nate the negative impacts of credit constraints, the existing educational subsidies
often benefit mostly high- and middle-income groups.3 In light of these tenden-
cies, the question of how widespread credit constraints are has critical relevance
for educational policy. In economic theory the issue of credit constraints is im-
portant because it violates one of the key economic assumptions of the life-cycle
permanent income hypothesis, namely, the assumption of perfect capital markets.
Nevertheless, despite their potential importance, it is still not clear just
how pervasive credit constraints are and precisely what impact they have on post-
secondary education in the United States. While a wide number of microeconomic
studies have addressed the issue, researchers have had to rely on theoretical in-
sights and information on educational outcomes to infer constraints in the absence
of direct measures.4 Some studies, for example, Manski (1992) and Ellwood and
Kane (2000), interpret disparities in educational attainment by family income as
evidence of credit constraints. Others (e.g., Kane, 1994) infer credit constraints
from the greater sensitivity of low-income students to tuition costs. Still others
appeal to an observation that marginal rates of return to education appear higher
than average rates (see Card, 2001). In contrast, Carneiro and Heckman (2002)
argue that it is long-run family and environmental influences rather than short-
1See, for example, Manski (1992), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Cameron and Heckman (1998),
and Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
2Goldin and Katz (2007).
3Fender and Wang (2003) provide a detailed theoretical discussion on educational policies to
remedy the inefficiencies resulting from credit constraints. For a comprehensive overview of the
distributional effects of financial aid programs, see Dynarski (2002).
4Most prominent studies include Manski (1992), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Card (2001),
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber (2004), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2008), and Cao (2008).
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term credit constraints that largely determine educational outcomes.5 To date, our
understanding of credit constraints in college education remains limited, due in
part to shortcomings of the data and differences in empirical methodologies. The
first paper to evaluate the usefulness of survey responses as a more direct measure
of credit constraints is a recent paper by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008).
Using a unique new data from a small private college with subsidized tuition, they
show that most of college attrition is unrelated to difficulties in borrowing, and,
hence conclude that credit constraints do not play a significant role in determining
educational attainment.
This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on self-reported diffi-
culties financing education and assessing its validity as a more direct measure of
credit constraints in a widely used, nationally representative data set, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). I broadly classify as constrained
those respondents who report that they expect to receive less education than de-
sired for financial reasons or need to work. As an indicator of credit constraints
this measure is quite noisy and not precise. Similar to all subjective measures, it is
likely to be influenced by a number of biases. At the same time it can help directly
identify individuals whose educational choices are potentially affected by diffi-
culties in paying for college. With these considerations in mind, I use regression
analysis to determine whether the probabilities of reporting financial difficulties
vary in a predictable and systematic way with individual characteristics, family
resources, and educational costs. Finally, to evaluate the internal consistency and
predictive power of the financial difficulties measure, I examine its relationship
with the respondents’ eventual educational outcomes.
About 12 percent of young adults in the sample report financial difficul-
ties in attaining their desired level of education. This estimate can be viewed as
an upper-bound estimate of the fraction of credit-constrained youths in the United
States. Regression analysis shows that youths from lower-income families and
those who live in areas with no universities in the vicinity are more likely to re-
port such difficulties, as are men who come from large families and Hispanic
women. Youths with financial difficulties are more likely to delay college entry
and choose lower-quality colleges, and they are less likely to receive a four-year
degree. Sizable differences in educational outcomes of those with self-reported
difficulties persist across a wide range of schooling outcomes, even after control-
5By conditioning the family background, Belley and Lochner (2007) have found a dramatic
increase in the effect of family income on college attendance between the early 1980s and the
early 2000s, consistent with the growing importance of credit constraints.
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ling for ability, parental income, and family background characteristics. While
the exact relationship between self-reported financial difficulties and educational
decisions is not clear, the measure developed in this paper appears to capture an
important new aspect of individual heterogeneity in the demand for college edu-
cation, beyond that addressed by the earlier research.
The present study addresses the growing need for more direct evidence
on the role of demand-side constraints in post-secondary education. My find-
ings are broadly consistent with a body of literature indicating that liquidity con-
straints have a potentially strong adverse effect on the education of a small frac-
tion of college-age individuals in the Unites States.6 Use of carefully designed
survey questions can help identify these individuals and guide policymakers look-
ing to craft effective recommendations to reduce persistent gaps in educational
outcomes.
2 Evidence of Credit Constraints in the Literature
What evidence does the literature offer regarding the impact of liquidity con-
straints on the demand for college education in the United States?7 This section
summarizes the literature’s most prominent findings and describes my contribu-
tion: the use of self-reported difficulties in financing education to identify poten-
tially liquidity-constrained students. By focusing on self-reports in NLSY79, this
study looks to evaluate how such information can enhance more traditional indi-
rect evaluation strategies. Careful consideration of self-reports may help bridge
the gap created by the lack of direct evidence on the role of constraints in college
education.
While college education is costly, financing it is not considered the sole
responsibility of students and their families (Lee, 1999; Heckman, 2000). A wide
range of government and private subsidies aim to alleviate the financial burden as-
sociated with college education to encourage enrollment. To the extent that these
subsidies do not fully cover education costs, students themselves are responsi-
ble to finance tuition and consumption while in school.8 In the absence of labor
6Using outcome information, for example, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) have estimated the
proportion of credit-constrained in the United States to be below 8 percent.
7Throughout the paper I use the words liquidity constraints synonymously with credit con-
straints, as does much of the related literature.
8Belley, Frenette, and Lochner (2008) provide a detailed discussion of out-of-pocket costs of
college education in the U.S.
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market earnings, they have to rely on private sector loans. As a result, children
from low-income families may be less able to pay for college than children from
high-income families.
A number of economic studies have documented sizable gaps in educa-
tional attainment by family income. Manski (1992) reports that only 11 percent
of high school graduates from the low end of the family income distribution re-
ceive a college education within the subsequent five years. This proportion is 39
percent for students from the top of the income distribution. Similarly, Ellwood
and Kane (2000) show that only 57 percent of children from the lowest-income
quartile attend a post-secondary educational institution after graduating from high
school, compared with 81 percent of children from the highest-income quartile.
These disparities have been widely believed to provide support for the hypothesis
of binding credit constraints.
An alternative explanation for these disparities comes from a strong rela-
tionship between family income and other factors, such as scholastic ability and
educational preferences, that affect the decision to go to college. Well-off families
have more resources to invest in their young children’s development in order to
boost cognitive and noncognitive skills. Children from families with higher so-
cioeconomic status often receive better primary and secondary education, which,
among other things, shapes their tastes for schooling and career expectations. As
a result they are more ready for college, on average, than students from lower-
income families and are more likely to receive a college education. These long-run
family factors are highly correlated with parental income and may be more impor-
tant in explaining the relationship between income and education than short-term
borrowing constraints. In support of this alternative explanation, Carneiro and
Heckman (2002) show that gaps in educational attainment across income groups
almost disappear when controls for family background and scholastic abilities are
introduced. Using the same empirical methodology, however, Belley and Lochner
(2007) have documented a dramatic increase in the effects of family income on
educational attainment between the cohorts of high school students in the early
1980s and the early 2000s. These findings are likely to renew the debate about the
relationship between family income and college education.
Although current income is a convenient benchmark for assessing needs,
some studies suggest that income in a given year is an imperfect measure of fi-
nancial resources and the ability to pay for college (see Kane, 2004). Alternative
indirect measures that perform better include wealth and short-term income fluctu-
ations. Jappelli (1990), for example, shows that family wealth is a strong predictor
of borrowing difficulties, even after controlling for family income. Mayer (1997)
5
finds that children whose families experience a large earnings decline within a
two-year period complete fewer years of college education. Similarly, studies that
examine the link between changes over time in family income distribution and
educational attainment of children show that the effects of income on college at-
tendance are greater than the effects in cross-section studies (e.g., Mayer, 1997;
Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001). These findings point toward a stronger impact of
credit constraints on education than is implied by studies using current income
levels.
Other evidence in the empirical microeconomic literature that is poten-
tially consistent with credit constraints includes the higher sensitivity of low-
income students to tuition costs (Kane, 1994) and longer delays in college en-
rollment for students in high-tuition states (Kane, 1996).
In the absence of clear consensus about the pervasiveness of credit con-
straints, a need for more direct evidence has emerged. The first study to address
this need is a recent work by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008). The au-
thors use carefully designed survey questions to elicit information about college
students’ borrowing difficulties and evaluate the fraction of the drop-out rate that
can be attributable to inability to borrow. While the results rely on data from a
single educational institution that is very different from most other colleges in the
United States, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) provide important insights
into the connection between borrowing constraints and the drop-out decisions of
low-income youth.9
The main contribution of my paper is the use of a new subjective indicator
of constraints in a standard data source. In the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth, 1979 (NLSY79), I identify potentially liquidity-constrained students
using their self-reports about financial difficulties in attaining the desired level
of education. The focus on self-reports is intuitively appealing as it allows to
make use of the information known to a respondent, but not to the analyst. A
large body of economics literature advocates this approach, suggesting that survey
questions allow to directly elicit pertinent information when alternatives involve
making nontrivial assumptions.10 At the same time, a number of theoretical and
practical problems arise in attempting to make causal inference relying exclusively
9Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) conduct their survey at Berea College, which is a
small, private four-year college in Kentucky with a mission of providing an education to students
from low-income backgrounds. Unlike most colleges in the United States, Berea College provides
full tuition and a room/board subsidy to all incoming students.
10Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Dominitz (1998) are pioneering studies that discuss the use
of self-reported information.
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on subjective reports. I discuss these problems in details later in this paper.
Relying on a data set that has been used by a number of earlier studies
to evaluate the importance of credit constraints in education allows me to view
my results in a broader context. It enables me to assess what information my
subjective measure adds to traditional methods of accessing financial need based
on family socioeconomic status. On a broader scale, this study is aimed at eval-
uating how useful subjective measures can be in helping the economists better
understand the role of credit constraints in the demand for education.
3 Data and Operational Definitions
To evaluate the alternative, and potentially more direct evidence about the im-
portance of liquidity constraints in education, I use a well-studied NLSY79 data
set. In this section, I describe the advantages of these data and the variables I
employ to empirically identify potentially constrained individuals. I present an
operational definition of constraints and discuss the assumptions and implications
behind it. According to my definition, over 12 percent of respondents in the sam-
ple can be classified as financially constrained. This is an upper-bound estimate
of the proportion of liquidity-constrained respondents in the NLSY79.
The NLSY79 data have been widely employed to evaluate the role of credit
constraints in education (see, e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and
Taber, 2004; Belley and Lochner, 2007). It is a rich longitudinal data set that
contains family background information and scholastic aptitude measures that are
essential for the analysis of educational choices (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
The NLSY79 follows the respondents for over twenty-five years, making it possi-
ble to evaluate schooling outcomes of the respondents without imposing an arbi-
trary cut-off age. Most importantly for this study, it elicits educational aspirations
and expectations of the respondents. This information makes it possible to de-
rive a measure of liquidity constraints that is potentially more direct than those
employed in the earlier research.
The focus of this paper is young adults around the time when they make
post-secondary schooling decisions. The group of interest comprises the youngest
respondents in the NLSY79: those who are between ages of 13 and 17, inclusively
in January 1978. In 1982, when educational aspirations and expectations were
recorded, they were 17 to 21 years old. Eliminating individuals who are over
17 years old at the initial interview date ensures that retrospectively collected
family background information is accurate. In addition, I exclude respondents
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with missing parental income or other background and personal data.11 The final
sample size is 5,161 individuals.
As an operational definition, I broadly denote as financially-constrained
those respondents who expect to receive less education than the desired level for
financial reasons or the need to work. I create an indicator of constraints based
on the answers they provide to three questions, asked during the 1982 wave of
the survey, regarding a desired education, an expected education, and the reasons
for discrepancies between the two, if such exist. The desired education is elicited
by asking: ”What is the highest grade or year of regular school that you would
like to complete”? The expected education is an answer to the question: ”As
things now stand, what is the highest grade or year [of schooling] you think you
will actually complete”? Those who expect to complete fewer years of schooling
than desired are asked: ”What is the main reason that you expect to complete less
regular schooling than you would like to complete”? The format of the questions
is multiple choice with a wide set of options, including family responsibilities,
academic abilities, and financial reasons.12 Those youths who expect to receive
less than the desired amount of schooling for financial reasons or because of the
need to work are denoted as constrained.
In the sample 1,175 respondents (23 percent) report that their expected
education is lower than the desired level (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). Of
these, 667 respondents, or about 13 percent, report financial difficulties (487 re-
spondents, or 9.4 percent) or need to work (180 respondents or 3.5 percent) as
a reason and, hence, are classified as liquidity constrained according to the def-
inition above. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative data set that oversam-
ples blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged youths.13 To evaluate
the proportion of the credit-constrained nationwide, one needs to correct for the
oversampling by using sampling weights. When reweighted to be nationally rep-
resentative, the proportion of credit-constrained respondents in the sample is only
slightly smaller, about 12 percent.
The operational definition presented above is very general and not a pre-
cise definition of liquidity constraints. Ideally, one would like to see what frac-
11Excluding the respondents with missing information is routinely done in studies that use the
NLSY79 and is unlikely to be an important source of bias. See, for example, Cameron and Taber
(2004).
12The exact formulation and distribution of answers is presented in the Appendix. The question
is somewhat restrictive as only one answer is permitted.
13The survey also includes 1,280 individuals who served in the military in 1978. This subsample
is excluded from the study because of the age restriction I impose.
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tion of potential college students forgoes education because of inability to finance
tuition or consumption due to inability to borrow. This would imply that the ex-
pected returns are sufficiently positive to offset the present cost. Unfortunately
such measure is not available in the NSLY79. In its absence, I use the definition
above as a proxy to identify individuals potentially constrained in educational
choices. This definition combines information about educational aspirations and
expectations with information about financial difficulties. Hence it is important to
provide some explanations about the assumptions that I make in interpreting the
questions and consider potential problems of this specific definition.
While it is not clear how exactly might individuals interpret the survey
questions above, following the earlier studies (e.g., Leigh and Gill, 2004), I as-
sume that the desired level of education (educational aspirations) is the level of
education that an individual would ideally like to obtain. It is reasonable to as-
sume that in stating their desired level of education, respondents take into account
expected costs and benefits of schooling. At the same time, it is not clear whether
or not they are realistic in accessing the impact of all the constraints that oper-
ate on educational decisions. Hence educational aspirations are likely to be an
upper-bound estimate of an optimal level of education.14
In this framework, expected level of education may be interpreted as an ed-
ucation the respondent is most likely to obtain given the current and/or expected
constraints. I assume that an answer to the question about the reasons why educa-
tional expectations are lower than aspirations refers to the most important of these
constraints. Under a broad definition of credit constraints in education, which en-
compasses the inability to obtain funds to pay college-related expenses or finance
consumption while at school, the most natural way of identifying potentially con-
strained individuals is by focusing on people who report financial difficulties or
need to work as an answer to that question.
Given these interpretations of the survey questions, a number of consider-
ations arise. First, liquidity constraints have a potential to reduce both educational
aspirations and expectations. For example, this might be the case if low-income
students do not have enough information about financial aid packages and/or sub-
sidized loans that are available to help pay for college.15 As a result they may
not consider college education as a feasible option and scale down their educa-
tional aspirations. In this case the estimated proportion of credit constrained in
14An optimal level of education refers to the schooling level that has the greatest probability of
maximizing the individual’s present value of lifetime income, given the constraints.
15Low take-up rate of Pell grant programs provides indirect support for this conjecture.
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the NLSY79 would be biased downwards, underestimating the true fraction of
liquidity-constrained.
Second, the respondents may overstate their financial difficulties in an
attempt to justify low educational aspirations that are due to other factors, for
example, lack of ability or interest in education. This phenomenon is know to
economists as justification bias. It usually implies that additional incentives exist
that make respondents more likely to report a specific condition (e.g., disability in
health economics literature). However, given a wide range of socially-acceptable
answers to the reasons question, it is not clear why a respondent trying to justify
their low education aspirations would choose financial difficulties or a need to
work over other possible answers.
Third, while the question about the reasons for having lower educational
expectations relative to aspirations covers a wide range of possible explanations,
it is not clear how well it can help us identify the individuals who would want to
borrow to finance college education if such an opportunity presented itself. More
specifically, it is not straightforward how the respondents may interpret the ”finan-
cial difficulties” answer. It could imply, for example, that a person views the costs
of college attendance to be too high relative to expected benefits. In this case, the
person is not necessarily credit constrained in education by the standard defini-
tion. Even if he or she faces prohibitively high interest rates or lacks access to
credit markets, removing these constraints may not affect their educational deci-
sions. This consideration implies that my measure may overestimate the fraction
of potential college students affected by credit constraints.
Some intuition about the importance of these factors can be obtained by
comparing the average characteristics of constrained and unconstrained youths in
the sample. Column (1) of Table 1 shows the characteristics of the full sample.
Columns (2) and (3) present the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained
youths, with t-statistics for the mean comparison between the two groups reported
in column (4).
Overall, it appears that constrained youths differ from unconstrained youths
in a way that might be consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints. For
example, constrained youths come from larger families and are more likely to
be of Hispanic origin than the unconstrained, which is generally associated with
higher borrowing costs (Cameron and Taber, 2004). Parental income of the con-
strained is 15 percent lower than that of the unconstrained: $16,600 a year versus
$19,500 a year, in 1979 dollars. While the average public tuition is only about
$1,100 dollars a year, it excludes the cost of room and board, which constitutes a
substantial portion of educational cost. Given that the average number of children
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Primary Variables
All Constrained Unconstrained T-statsb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0.498 0.487 0.499 0.582
Black 0.262 0.246 0.265 1.036
Hispanic 0.168 0.205 0.162 2.786***
Age 19.04 1.36 19.26 1.29 19.00 1.37 4.563***
Number of siblings 3.784 2.598 4.010 2.702 3.751 2.581 2.412**
Avg. public tuition 1,092 377 1,063 378 1,097 366 2.166**
Local earnings 2.460 0.502 2.452 0.495 2.461 0.503 0.428
Local college 0.851 0.868 0.848 1.326
Urban residence 0.758 0.736 0.761 1.386
Ability Test Scores
Math 11.798 6.123 11.246 5.696 11.880 6.180 2.498**
Word 22.264 8.275 21.759 8.290 22.340 8.271 1.692*
Science 13.684 5.112 13.264 4.876 13.746 5.144 2.273**
Automotive 11.745 5.182 11.582 4.988 11.769 5.210 0.871
Combined AFQT scores 37.424 1.149 34.728 1.015 37.824 0.416 2.694***
Characteristics at Age 17
Parental income 19,080 15,340 16,580 13,490 19,450 15,570 4.527***
Mother’s education 11.981 1.873 11.788 1.782 12.000 1.884 2.422***
Father’s education 12.574 2.415 12.347 2.160 12.605 2.447 2.059**
N 5161 667 4494
Proportion 100 12.9 87.1
Notes: a) Expressed in 1979 dollars. b) Testing the hypothesis of equality of means
between the constrained and the unconstrained.
in the sample is close to five, college-related expenses may indeed prove to be too
high of a financial burden for some low-income families.
At the same time, some differences point towards the potential justifica-
tion bias and the possibility that the youths who report financial difficulties (con-
strained youths) may have lower benefits of education. More specifically, the
constrained youths in the sample are more likely to come from lower-educated
families and have lower average test scores than the unconstrained youths. This
points towards lower college-readiness and lower demand for education among
the youths who report constraints.
To provide some further evidence about the potentially lower returns to
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schooling among individuals who report credit constraints, Figure 1 explores the
relationship between self-reported constraints, socioeconomic background, and
ability in more detail. It shows the proportion of constrained youths by parental
income, and quartile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which is a
measure of scholastic ability.16 Youths from wealthier families are less likely to
report credit constraints than youths from poorer families across all ability quar-
tiles. Moreover, there is strict ordering by parental income in the highest-ability
quartile, where individuals usually have the highest demand for college education
(Ellwood and Kane, 2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
At the same time, there is no clear ordering in the proportion of credit-
constrained across the ability quartiles, which suggests that low-ability youths are
not more likely to report credit constraints than high-ability youths when parental
income is taken into account. If the same analysis is performed by educational
aspirations groups (see Figures A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix), one can easily
note that high-ability youths are more likely to report credit constraints than low-
ability youths, especially at the high levels of educational aspirations (college or
higher). These results are consistent with the idea that high-ability individuals
have a higher demand for education, and hence, are more likely to be affected by
credit constraints. Figures A-2 and A-3 imply that justification and low-returns
biases may not be as important as it appears initially from looking at Table 1.
To evaluate the importance of justification bias in reporting financial dif-
ficulties, I examine educational attainment of the respondents twelve years af-
ter they reported educational expectations. If youths from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds who have lower test scores are more likely to overpredict their final
education levels, this would provide some evidence in favor of the justification
hypothesis. Figure A-4 in the Appendix presents the fraction of individuals who
report lower levels of education in 1994 than they expected in 1982, by family
income and ability terciles. Consistent with evidence in the earlier literature, (e.g.
Reynolds and Pemberton, 2001; Rouse, 2004), sample respondents are overly op-
timistic in their educational expectations. About 40 percent of youths in my sam-
ple do not achieve their expected levels of schooling. At the same time, youths
from low-income families are equally likely to overpredict their final educational
attainment across all ability groups. Moreover, high-ability ”poor” youths are
more likely to overpredict their educational attainment than high-ability ”reach”
youths, which is potentially consistent with the effects of credit constraints. Over-
16The composition of the AFQT scores and their link with the Armed Services Vocational Ap-
titude Battery (ASVAB) scores is described in a later section.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Credit Constraints over Parental Income and AFQT
Quartile, NLSY79
all, Figure A-4 provides no evidence in favor of high importance of the justifica-
tion bias in reporting credit constraints.
The results of this section indicate that the justification bias and the low-
returns to education bias do not strongly influence individual responses. At the
same time, it is important to note that my measure does not exactly reflect what
would happen to educational choices if financial difficulties were elevated. Hence,
it is reasonable to interpret the proportion of youths who report financial difficul-
ties as an upper-bound estimate of the true fraction of individuals whose educa-
tional decisions are affected by credit constraints. I will illustrate this point more
formally in the next section. This implies that my estimates are broadly consistent
with the results in Carneiro and Heckman (2002), who conclude that only up to 8
percent of the U.S. population is credit constrained in education.
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4 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a conceptual definition of credit constraints using a simple
two-period model of schooling choices. The purpose of this model is twofold.
First, it sets up a framework for empirical analysis of the characteristics of the
constrained individuals by elucidating the pertinent variables. Second, it serves
as a warning concerning the extent to which we can interpret the results of this
analysis. The limitations arise because binding credit constraints and the demand
for education are codetermined.
In the simple model, assume that individuals are looking to maximize con-
sumption over two periods. The value of consumption discounted back to the
initial period is given as:
c0 + βc1 6 YS, (1)
where c0 and c1 are consumption in periods zero and one respectively, β is the
time-preference rate, and YS is the net preset value of income with schooling S.
In the first period, an individual earns unskilled wages w0 and can choose
to attend college, for which she has to pay the direct cost q.17 Assume that there are
only two schooling choices: high school and college. Define an indicator variable
S = 1 if college is chosen and S = 0 otherwise. Having a college education pays
w1 in the second period. Hence the income stream from high school education
discounted to period zero at an interest rate r can be expressed as:
Y0 = w0 +
1
1 + r
w0, (2)
and the income stream from college education as:
Y1 = w0 − q + 1
1 + r
w1. (3)
The individual chooses a schooling option that yields a higher level of consump-
tion.18
Assume that interest rates the individuals face are heterogeneous. Hetero-
geneity in interest rates is a common way to model credit constraints – see, for
example, Willis and Rosen (1979), Card (1995a), and Cameron and Taber (2004).
17This model is very general and assumes that individuals can work during college and earn
unschooled wages w0. The results below do not depend on this assumption.
18The time-preference rate can be normalized as β = 11+r for unconstrained individuals, im-
plying that they want to perfectly smoothen consumption across the two periods.
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Figure 2: Binding Credit Constraints
Figure 3: Non-Binding Credit Constraints
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This assumption follows from a real-world observation that people have very dif-
ferent capabilities to collateralize loans with personal or family assets and differ
in their ability to repay. Credit-constrained individuals borrow at a high interest
rate, which makes educational financing even more costly.
Figure 2 shows how credit constraints defined in this way can influence
the individual’s demand for education. It depicts budget lines under the two alter-
native schooling options S = 0 and S = 1 for two interest rates, r and r′, where
r > r′. Budget lines V0 and V1 correspond to income streams from schooling
when the interest rate is r. V0 lies to the right of V1, indicating that a high school
education yields higher levels of consumption than a college education. When the
borrowing rate is decreased to r′, the corresponding budget lines are V ′0 and V
′
1 .
Under the new lower interest rate, V ′1 lies to the right of V
′
0 , implying that a col-
lege education now yields higher consumption than high school. In this example,
credit constraints are binding in the sense that a change in the interest rate changes
the optimal schooling level.
Assume now that w1 and w0 are heterogeneous in the population, so that
even if the interest rate is low, it does not pay for everyone to go to college. This
assumption originates from the notion of comparative advantage in the labor mar-
kets, popularized byWillis and Rosen (1979), and is consistent with heterogeneity
in responses to education, which is an empirically important phenomenon (Heck-
man, 2000). When returns to education are heterogeneous, whether or not the
constraint binds is determined by these returns. Figure 3 illustrates this propo-
sition by showing that a decline in the interest rate does not necessarily imply a
change in the budget line ordering. In this figure the benefits to education w1 are
lower and the costs of education q are higher than in Figure 2. As a result, the
budget line associated with high school education is higher than the budget line
for college education, for both interest rates r and r′. Since a decrease in the in-
terest rate in this example does not affect the optimal schooling choice, the credit
constraints are not binding.
This simple example demonstrates more formally an intuitive consider-
ation discussed in the previous section: whether or not credit constraints bind
depends on the costs and benefits of education. When costs are high and ben-
efits are low, removing credit constraints may not necessarily change individual
schooling decisions. In an empirical analysis of the link between credit constraints
and educational attainment, it is possible to control for potential costs and bene-
fits by conditioning on local, individual, and family background characteristics.
Variables that capture these characteristics are presented below.
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5 Explanatory Variables
Although I define credit constraints as heterogeneous borrowing rates, the sec-
tion above shows that whether or not they are binding depends on all the fac-
tors that determine individual demand for education. Denote the probability of
reporting credit constraints as P . This probability can be expressed as a func-
tion of the interest rate r, schooling costs q, and potential earnings w0 and w1:
P = f(w0, w1, q, r). Since none of these determinants is directly observed in
the data, I rely on observable individual and labor market characteristics as proxy
variables in estimating the probability P . The results can be interpreted as partial
correlations and serve to provide information about the characteristics of individ-
uals who consider themselves credit constrained.
The variables introduced in the estimation include the determinants of in-
dividual demand for education and the costs of borrowing. These are ability test
scores, family financial and background information, local schooling costs, and
individual characteristics. Although in most cases it is not possible to identify
the impact of these explanatory variables on each of the arguments of P sepa-
rately, economic intuition and findings of the earlier studies suggest the direction
of relationships between the probability of reporting credit constraints and these
variables.
1. Ability Test Scores. Ability plays an important role as a determinant
of potential earnings w0 and w1. To the extent that higher abilities make learning
more effective, higher scholastic aptitude may be associated with higher benefits
to education.19 Hence individuals with higher scholastic abilities should display
a higher demand for education and a higher probability of reporting credit con-
straints. At the same time, educational institutions are looking to attract high-
ability students, so they offer them substantial tuition subsidies that reduce the
price of education. This implies that individuals with higher scholastic abilities
should be less likely to expect credit constraints. As a result of these two contra-
dictory influences, the anticipated relationship between the ability indicators and
the probability of reporting constraints is ambiguous.
In the NLSY79, scholastic ability is captured by the Armed Forces Qual-
ification Test (AFQT) scores. The AFQT scores have been widely used by social
scientists as a measure of cognitive ability and scholastic aptitude (see, e.g., Caw-
ley et al., 2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). The score is a weighted average
19A wide range of studies, e.g., Willis and Rosen (1979), Cameron and Heckman (1998),
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), provide indirect support for this claim by showing a strong positive
correlation between scholastic ability and educational attainment.
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of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test results. The
ASVAB measures knowledge and skill in ten different academic and vocational
areas. In this study I use the combined AFQT test scores as well as the scores
from the four separate sections of the ASVAB test: math, word knowledge, sci-
ence, and automotive ability. While the AFQT scores measure general scholastic
aptitude and trainability, the separate test scores capture a wider range of specific
abilities. Capturing specific abilities is important since they are associated with
different areas of competitive advantage in the labor markets. A young person
with higher automotive scores may have a stronger potential as a plumber than as
a lawyer, whereas higher word knowledge scores indicate the opposite. Students
in the sample took the test in the summer of 1980, when they were between 15
and 18 years old. The averages of the raw scores are presented in the first column
of Table 1.
2. Family Background Characteristics. The family background char-
acteristics that I use in this paper are parental income, parental education, and
number of siblings. The probability P is expected to decrease with parental in-
come and education, and increase with number of siblings.
Because of a well-documented link between family financial resources and
children’s education, parental income has received considerable attention in edu-
cation research.20 To the extent that parents are willing to provide their children
with access to funds, higher parental income implies lower costs of borrowing.
Moreover, parental income can serve as collateral when young adults use private
lenders to borrow for school. As a result, children from poor families may face
higher interest rates on private loans or may lack access to private lending sources
altogether.
At the same time, parental income serves as a benchmark for financial need
assessment. Need-based grants (e.g., the Federal Pell Grant Program) and subsi-
dized loans (e.g., the Federal Perkins Loan Program) reduce the out-of-pocket
cost of college education for low-income students. The amount of financial aid
decreases as income increases, which implies a positive correlation between the
cost of education and parental income for low- and middle-income families. Bel-
ley and Lochner (2007), however, show in their recent paper that a positive re-
lationship between out-of-pocket schooling costs and parental income does not
translate into a negative relationship between income and education if individuals
are limited in the amount they can borrow. This implies that we can anticipate
20See Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for a detailed discussion of the link between parental in-
come and educational outcomes.
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an inverse relationship between parental income and the probability of reporting
credit constraints. Parental income is measured when the respondents are age 17,
to make sure they are still living with their parents.21 Mean parental income in the
sample is $19,900 in 1979 dollars, which is equivalent to $56,800 in 2007 dollars.
The expectations regarding the influence of parental education on the prob-
ability P are similar. As parental education is a good indicator of the family’s
socioeconomic status and the child’s preferences for education, the probability of
reporting credit constraints, conditional on potential benefits to education, should
decrease with an increase in parental education. We can expect this because higher
socioeconomic background is associated with lower costs of borrowing. Parental
education is measured in years of schooling completed by the respondents’ par-
ents.
The number of siblings is expected to have a positive relationship on the
probability of reporting credit constraints, conditional on potential benefits to ed-
ucation. The number of siblings influences the portion of the family financial
resources available to an individual: having fewer siblings implies access to a
bigger share.
3. Local Characteristics. Local characteristics include state public tu-
ition costs, the presence of a two- or a four-year college in the county of residence,
binary variables for Census geographic regions, and a binary variable for residence
in a metropolitan statistical area. The first two variables serve as proxies for direct
schooling costs. The higher the schooling costs, the more individuals may need
to borrow, and the more likely they are to be affected by credit constraints. Hence
the probability of reporting credit constraints is expected to increase with the av-
erage public tuition and decrease with the presence of a college in the county of
residence.
Although the exact costs of college education may vary with the type and
location of the university, as well as the specific financial aid package, they can
be approximated by characteristics of the locality in which the person lives. Lo-
cal supply-side variables should perform well in this study, as young people are
likely to evaluate schooling costs using the information available to them locally
and from public sources. A number of earlier studies have used average pub-
lic university tuition and the presence of a college nearby to control for schooling
costs.22 State governments subsidize public universities to reduce tuition costs and
21For a small fraction of individuals in the sample with missing parental income at age 17, it is
recorded at age 16 or earlier.
22Kane (1994) and Van der Klaauw (2002) used tuition costs, and Card (1995b) and Cameron
and Taber (2004) used presence of a college in the county of residence.
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to ensure equal access to higher education for students of all income levels. Hence
average public tuition is a good proxy for individual tuition costs in the analysis
of credit constraints. At the same time, living expenses account for a substantial
portion of educational costs at the university level.23 So an opportunity to live at
home or with parents results in a sizable reduction of expenditures associated with
college attendance, which is especially important for low- and moderate-income
families.
The local schooling cost variables are merged from the Department of
Education’s Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) using the
restricted Geocodes state and county identifiers.24 About 87 percent of individuals
live in a county with a two- or a four-year accredited college nearby. Average
public university tuition varies substantially across the states: from $365 per-year
in Washington, D.C., to above $2,000 in Vermont, with a sample mean of about
$1,100, in 1979 dollars (see Table 1).
4. Individual Characteristics. Individual characteristics included in this
study are race, ethnicity, and gender. Race and ethnicity have an ambiguous rela-
tionship to the probability of reporting credit constraints. Non-white or Hispanic
individuals potentially face higher costs of borrowing because of discrimination.
Jappelli (1990), for example, shows that non-whites are about 5 percentage points
more likely to be rejected when applying for loans than whites. If lenders ra-
tion credit more severely for these groups, we can expect to see a positive re-
lationship between being non-white or Hispanic and the probability of reporting
credit constraints. At the same time, affirmative action policies may make college
education more affordable for minority groups by offering targeted financial aid
packages. As a result, the relationship between self-reported credit constraints
and ethnic/racial minority group membership is ambiguous.
Gender has always played an important role in educational attainment
analysis. Historically, men received more years of education than women. How-
ever, the educational attainment of women has been increasing at a faster pace,
and from the beginning of the 1990s more young women than men have been
receiving college degrees (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). Some studies have shown
that non-pecuniary motives in education are more important for women than men
(Reisburg, 2000). Moreover, women’s college attendance decisions have been less
influenced by competing opportunities than have men’s college attendance deci-
23Lee (1999) estimated that living expenses constitute about 70 percent of the total cost of one
year at a public four-year college and over three-quarters of the cost at a public two-year institution.
24See the Appendix A.2 for a description of the HEGIS and the restricted Geocodes data.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Constrained Men and Women
Men Women T-statsb
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Black 0.278 0.212 1.965**
Hispanic 0.178 0.234 1.774*
Age 19.29 1.31 19.23 1.27 0.671
Number of siblings 4.246 2.880 3.763 2.480 2.313**
Avg. public tuition 1,052 364 1,074 369 0.820
Local college 0.877 0.858 0.713
Urban residence at 17 0.769 0.702 1.979**
Ability Test Scores
Math score 10.500 5.643 12.031 5.654 3.498***
Word score 20.716 8.680 22.855 7.721 3.356***
Science score 13.377 5.177 13.145 4.541 0.269
Automotive score 13.325 5.421 9.748 3.693 9.908***
Combined AFQT score 32.029 26.123 37.560 26.014 2.736
Characteristics at Age 17
Parental income 1,684 1,342 1,630 1,357 0.512
Mother’s education 11.748 1.932 11.830 1.932 0.500
Father’s education 12.271 2.219 12.422 2.103 0.719
N 342 325
Proportion 13.19 12.65
Notes: a) Expressed in 1979 dollars. b) Testing the hypothesis of equality of means
between the constrained and the unconstrained.
sions (Averett and Burton, 1996). Table A-1 in the Appendix shows substantial
gender differences in answers to the question about the aspirations-expectations
gap. Women are more likely than men to report financial reasons and family re-
sponsibilities as the source of the gap, whereas men are more likely to report the
need to work and difficulties in learning.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for constrained individuals by gender.
It shows significant differences in the racial and ethnic composition of the two
subsamples, as well as in their ability test scores. About 28 percent of constrained
men are black and 19 percent are Hispanic, while among constrained women, 21
percent are black and 23 percent Hispanic. Constrained women have higher math
and word knowledge test scores than unconstrained women, while automotive
scores are much higher for constrained versus unconstrained men. Constrained
men are also more likely to come from bigger families and to live in an urban area
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than constrained women. Although the exact implications of these differences are
not clear, they call for separate analyses of constrained men and women.
6 Results
The simple model presented in Section 4 shows that under certain conditions
credit constraints can adversely impact individual schooling decisions. The panel
nature of the NLSY79 data allows us to evaluate this prediction by focusing on
educational attainment of constrained and unconstrained youths. The first part of
this section presents logistic estimates of the probability of reporting constraints as
a function of the explanatory variables described above. The second part examines
the role of self-reported constraints as a determinant of a battery of educational
outcomes. The results imply that the measure of financial difficulties developed
in this paper captures the aspects individual heterogeneity pertinent to educational
outcomes and potentially related to credit constraints.
6.1 Probability of Reporting Constraints
The discussion in the previous section has established that the probability of re-
porting credit constraints should be directly related to schooling costs and the
costs of borrowing. Below I present logistic estimates of the probability of re-
porting constraints conditional on proxies for these factors in addition to other
individual, family, and local labor market characteristics outlined above. The re-
sults are purely descriptive and do not bear causal interpretation. They can be
interpreted as conditional partial correlations that reveal the characteristics of in-
dividuals who perceive themselves as credit constrained in educational choices.
Although it is not possible to establish the extent to which self-reported
financial difficulties mirror the actual constrained status, the results overall accord
with the economic intuition. The probability of reporting financial difficulties
varies in a predictable fashion with the indicators of schooling costs and the costs
of borrowing. At the same time, there are substantial gender differences in some
of the determinants. For notational convenience, I refer to individuals who report
financial difficulties as credit constrained in this section.
The regression coefficients and marginal effects estimated separately for
men and women are presented in Table 3. To take into account the impact of
financial aid available to low-income students, the empirical model includes a
spline in parental income. Table 3 shows that for non-low-income youths the
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Table 3: Estimated Probability of Reporting Credit Constraints
Men Women
Coeff. Marg. Effect Coeff. Marg. Effect
Parental income/10,000 -0.117** -0.013** -0.114** -0.012**
(0.053) (0.006) (0.048) (0.005)
Parental income in 1st Quartile -0.104 -0.011 -0.215* -0.023*
(0.084) (0.009) (0.125) (0.013)
Avg. tuition/1,000 -0.193 -0.021 -0.108 -0.011
(0.214) (0.023) (0.229) (0.024)
Local college (d) -0.332 -0.033* -0.486** -0.045***
(0.204) (0.019) (0.194) (0.016)
Black (d) -0.251 -0.026 -0.119 -0.012
(0.187) (0.019) (0.183) (0.019)
Hispanic (d) -0.258 -0.026 0.415** 0.049**
(0.198) (0.019) (0.180) (0.023)
Math score/10 -0.311** -0.034** 0.171 0.018
(0.151) (0.016) (0.154) (0.016)
Word score/10 0.107 0.012 0.091 0.010
(0.139) (0.015) (0.150) (0.016)
Science score/10 -0.105 -0.011 -0.179 -0.019
(0.195) (0.021) (0.243) (0.026)
Automotive score/10 0.068 0.007 0.016 0.002
(0.152) (0.017) (0.240) (0.025)
Number of siblings 0.045** 0.005** -0.014 -0.002
(0.022) (0.002) (0.026) (0.003)
Mother’s education -0.003 -0.000 -0.049 -0.005
(0.026) (0.003) (0.031) (0.003)
Father’s education -0.019 -0.002 0.016 0.002
(0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)
Urban residence (d) 0.039 0.004 -0.549*** -0.065***
(0.205) (0.022) (0.162) (0.021)
Constant -1.106** -1.272***
(0.478) (0.449)
Log likelihood -982 -953
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.023
N 2,592 2,569
NOTES: a) For binary variables, denoted as (d), marginal effects are estimated for changes
from zero to one. b) Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary correlation
across persons who live in the same county. c) Additional controls include cohort indicators
and indicators for residence in the four standard census regions.
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probability of reporting credit constraints decreases with parental income. A ten-
thousand dollar increase in parental income is associated with a decrease of about
1.3 percentage-point in the probability of reporting credit constraints for both men
and women. This is equivalent to a 10 percent change, since the proportion of
credit constrained individuals in both subsamples is about 13 percent. For men in
the lowest quartile of family income distribution, parental income is not a signif-
icant predictor of the probability of reporting constraints. By contrast, parental
income is a strong predictor of constraints reporting for women in the lowest
quartile of family income distribution. The magnitude of the marginal effect is
almost twice as large relative to the rest of the income distribution. This result is
not necessarily intuitive, since need-based financial aid is generally independent
of gender. It indicates that men and women at the bottom of the family income
distribution have different beliefs about their credit-constrained status.
Consistent with the intuition described in the previous section, living in a
county with a college nearby is associated with a lower probability of reporting
credit constraints. A nearby college is associated with a 3.3 percentage-point (or
a 25 percent) decrease in P for men and a 4.5 percentage-point (or a 35 percent)
decrease in P for women.
There are other important gender differences in the results. For example,
higher math scores have a strong negative association with the probability of re-
porting credit constraints for men, but not for women. For women, ability test
scores do not play an important role as credit-constraint determinants. Similarly,
for men, having an additional sibling is associated with an increase in the prob-
ability P of about 0.5 percentage points (or 4 percent), whereas for women the
number of siblings is not statistically significant. Hispanic women are about 4.8
percentage points (or 37 percent) more likely to report credit constraints than non-
Hispanic women. Women living in urban areas are half as likely to report credit
constraints as their counterparts in rural areas (a 6.5 percentage-point difference).
At the same time, race/ethnicity and urban residence are not significant for men.
These gender differences indicate that schooling expectations are formed differ-
ently for men and women. A low significance of ability scores, for example, may
indicate that women put more weight on the non-pecuniary benefits of education.
6.2 Educational Outcomes of the Constrained
Below I employ an empirical framework similar to the one used by Carneiro and
Heckman (2002) to evaluate the internal consistency of the credit constraints mea-
sure. I augment their model that examines the link between parental income, abil-
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ity, and educational outcomes with my credit constraints indicator. While this ex-
ercise is purely descriptive, it provides some insights about the predictive power
of the measure and its potential for identifying person-specific heterogeneity in
borrowing costs and the ability to finance college education.
Table 4: Estimated Probability of College Enrollment at Age 20, Men
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
Constrained -0.075*** -0.027* 0.003 -0.173***
(0.025) (0.016) (0.044) (0.063)
Income quartile 1 -0.149*** -0.042** -0.107*** -0.098
(0.024) (0.019) (0.041) (0.064)
Income quartile 2 -0.089*** -0.022 -0.005 -0.120**
(0.026) (0.018) (0.044) (0.057)
Income quartile 3 -0.083*** -0.002 -0.081** -0.098**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.047)
Black 0.038 0.069*** 0.250*** 0.233***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.048) (0.048)
Hispanic 0.131*** 0.049 0.305*** 0.062
(0.035) (0.039) (0.057) (0.059)
Both parents 0.017 0.015 0.033 0.002
(0.023) (0.015) (0.037) (0.052)
Father’s education 0.027*** -0.001 0.020*** 0.021**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
Mother’s education 0.025*** 0.005** 0.006 0.033***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of siblings -0.023*** -0.003 -0.013** -0.024**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010)
South 0.031 0.010 0.043 0.092**
(0.023) (0.015) (0.034) (0.041)
Urban residence -0.002 -0.008 -0.038 0.013
(0.024) (0.018) (0.042) (0.045)
Log likelihood -1,358 -207 -434 -501
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.083 0.083 0.123
N 2,592 908 831 853
NOTES: Marginal effects, standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include cohort
indicators.
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Table 5: Estimated Probability of College Enrollment at Age 20, Women
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
Constrained 0.011 0.047 -0.049 0.034
(0.029) (0.034) (0.047) (0.053)
Income quartile 1 -0.234*** -0.111*** -0.128*** -0.247***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.045) (0.058)
Income quartile 2 -0.114*** -0.031 -0.043 -0.136**
(0.029) (0.025) (0.047) (0.056)
Income quartile 3 -0.089*** -0.022 -0.094** -0.020
(0.024) (0.025) (0.042) (0.048)
Black 0.160*** 0.182*** 0.431*** 0.207***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.046) (0.050)
Hispanic 0.153*** 0.211*** 0.335*** 0.086
(0.043) (0.060) (0.056) (0.058)
Both parents 0.043* 0.002 0.068* -0.018
(0.025) (0.019) (0.038) (0.053)
Father’s education 0.036*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Mother’s education 0.022*** 0.007** -0.001 0.024***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of siblings -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.015* -0.016*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
South 0.043 0.016 0.014 0.080**
(0.026) (0.019) (0.036) (0.038)
Urban residence 0.036 0.021 0.007 0.043
(0.027) (0.022) (0.043) (0.044)
Log likelihood -1,404. -289 -442 -502
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.169 0.152 0.117
N 2,569 867 850 852
NOTES: Marginal effects, standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include cohort
indicators.
Tables 4 and 5 report marginal effects from logistic regressions of the prob-
ability of being enrolled in a college at age 20 (or age 21 for the oldest cohort in
the sample), for men and women. I adopt the specification used by Carneiro and
Heckman (2002) and include my indicator of credit constraints as an additional re-
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gressor. The estimates without conditioning on the ability test scores (AFQT) are
presented in the first column of the tables (”Total”). The following three columns
report the estimates for different AFQT score groups. Ability test scores cap-
ture the long-run differences in socioeconomic background and largely determine
individual demand for education.
The results show that the credit constraints indicator is an important pre-
dictor of college enrollment for men, but not for women. Men who report credit
constraints are 7.5 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in college at age 20,
relative to men who do not report constraints. This relationship is even stronger
for men in the top tercile of the AFQT distribution: the gap in college enrollment
by self-reported credit constraints is 17.3 percentage points.
Following the same methodology, I examine the relationship between self-
reported constraints and other dimensions of schooling. Credit constraints can
affect individual schooling decisions on a number of margins, such as timing of
enrollment, quality of the university, or employment while at school. For this
study it is especially important to examine an array of schooling outcomes to eval-
uate internal consistency of the measure. If the measure is internally consistent,
we can expect to see systematic and persistent differences between constrained
and unconstrained youths along more than one outcome margin. Conditioning
on family income, family background, and ability test scores allows to isolate the
contribution of the constraints measure not attributable to long-run socioeconomic
differences.
In addition to college enrollment, I use five other dimensions of education.
These dimensions are expressed as binary outcomes to make interpretation more
straightforward. They come from the 1994 wave of the survey, conducted when
the respondents were between the ages of 39 to 43 and had completed the bulk of
their schooling. Two binary variables capture educational attainment: an indicator
for completing a four-year degree and an indicator for completing a two-year de-
gree (for those who do not complete a four-year degree). For those who received
a two- or a four-year degree, another binary indicates if the degree was received
without a delay. Quality of education is captured by two indicators: enrollment in
a four-year versus a two-year college, and enrollment in a college with compet-
itive admissions standards.25 Raw and adjusted gaps (”Beta”) in these outcomes
between constrained and unconstrained men and women, including the gaps in
college enrollment, are presented in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The adjusted
25Competitive admissions standards is a measure unique to this study. It is the one measure out
of six that does not appear in Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
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gaps are marginal effects from logistic regressions with the same covariates as in
Tables 4 and 5.26
Table 6: Gaps in Educational Outcomes of Constrained Men
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
Raw Beta Raw Beta Raw Beta Raw Beta
Panel A - Enrollment in College
-0.100*** -0.075** -0.034 -0.027* -0.013 0.003 -0.163*** -0.173***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.041) (0.044) (0.057) (0.063)
Panel B - Complete 4-Year College
-0.097*** -0.054*** -0.014 -0.009 -0.072** -0.047*** -0.121** -0.100*
(0.022) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.029) (0.016) (0.057) (0.058)
Panel C - Complete 2-Year College
-0.047** -0.032* -0.018 -0.013 -0.032 -0.027 -0.062 -0.047
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.010) (0.033) (0.027) (0.052) (0.050)
Panel D - Proportion of People not Delaying College
-0.090* -0.062 -0.111 -0.059 -0.004 -0.033 -0.133** -0.093
(0.049 (0.051) (0.092) (0.095) (0.082) (0.089) (0.059) (0.094)
Panel E - Enrollment in a 4-Year versus 2-Year College
-0.067 -0.056 -0.018 -0.007 -0.046 -0.023 -0.086 -0.084
(0.046) (0.048) (0.071) (0.073) (0.082) (0.087) (0.081) (0.090)
Panel F - Enrollment in a Competitive College
-0.063 -0.037 -0.077 0.064 -0.082 -0.034 -0.166* -0.160*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.059) (0.060) (0.074) (0.074) (0.093) (0.095)
NOTES: Standard errors in parenthesis. All results are presented relative to the unconstrained
men. Beta, or adjusted gaps, are marginal effects from logit regressions.
The results of Table 6 show substantial differences between constrained
and unconstrained men along most of the schooling outcome dimensions. The
first two columns of the table present the gaps estimated for all men (”Total”).
They appear substantial, varying between 5 and 10 percentage points for different
outcomes. All the raw gaps, except for the gaps in school quality, are statistically
significant at conventional levels, indicating that men who report credit constraints
are less likely to receive a two-year or a four-year degree, and are more likely
to delay enrollment. Conditioning on individual and family background charac-
teristics reduces these gaps, but does not eliminate them. The gaps in college
enrollment and completion remain statistically significant. Self-reported credit
26The full regression results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 7: Gaps in Educational Outcomes of Constrained Women
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
Raw Beta Raw Beta Raw Beta Raw Beta
Panel A - Enrollment in College
-0.026 0.009 0.041 0.059 -0.043 -0.053 -0.077 -0.017
(0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.052)
Panel B - Complete 4-Year College
-0.036 -0.012 0.033 0.015 -0.014 -0.004 -0.128*** -0.086*
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.051) 0.052
Panel C - Complete 2-Year College
0.006 0.013 0.012 0.035 -0.014 -0.007 -0.016 -0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051)
Panel D - Proportion of People not Delaying College
-0.074** -0.027 0.016 0.052 -0.155*** -0.103 -0.068 -0.001
(0.038) (0.036) (0.074) (0.064) (0.062) (0.071) (0.054) (0.031)
Panel E - Enrollment in a 4-Year versus 2-Year College
-0.103*** -0.088** -0.066 -0.066 -0.159** -0.165** -0.099* -0.056
(0.039) (0.042) (0.066) (0.065) (0.071) (0.072) (0.060) (0.065)
Panel F - Enrollment in a Competitive College
0.042 0.075 0.043 0.055 0.083 0.095 0.001 0.055
(0.036) (0.040) (0.052) (0.055) (0.064) (0.072) (0.067) (0.075)
NOTES: Standard errors in parenthesis. All results are presented relative to the unconstrained
women. Beta, or adjusted gaps, are marginal effects from logit regressions.
constraints account for a 5 percentage-point gap in a 4-year college completion
and a 3 percentage-point gap in a 2-year college completion.
The rest of Table 6 presents the gaps estimated by the AFQT terciles. De-
pending on their location in the AFQT distribution, individuals vary in their de-
mand for education and perception of credit constraints. Unsurprisingly, there
are no gaps in schooling outcomes for men at the bottom of the AFQT distri-
bution. Low-ability individuals have a low demand for college education and
hence are less likely to be affected by credit constraints. At the same time, there
are large and significant gaps in college enrollment, completion, and quality for
high-ability men. Constrained men at the top of the AFQT distribution are 16
percentage points less likely to be enrolled in college at age 20, and 13 percentage
points more likely to delay if they do choose to enroll. They are also 12 percent-
age points less likely to complete a four-year degree and 17 percentage points less
likely to enroll in a competitive university. Controlling for individual and back-
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ground characteristics does not reduce the gaps in college enrollment and quality.
The persistence of these gaps indicates that the self-reported credit constraints re-
veal important information about the college choices of men, beyond that captured
by parental income and ability measures.
For women the picture is less clear. As Table 7 shows, constrained and
unconstrained women statistically differ only in college delays and enrollment in
a four- versus two-year college. Similar to the results for men, credit constraints
have a somewhat stronger predictive power for women at the top of the AFQT
distribution. Constrained women in the highest AFQT tercile are 10 percentage
points less likely to enroll in a four-year institution and 13 percentage points less
likely to complete a four-year degree than unconstrained women. Overall the
results indicate that self-reported credit constraints are not a strong predictor of
educational outcomes for women when controls for parental income and family
background are introduced (except for a four-year degree completion for high-
ability women).
7 Conclusions
The results of this study indicate that up to 12 percent of college-age youths in the
NLSY79 are potentially constrained in their educational choices. Because of the
noisy nature of my measure, this proportion is an upper-bound estimated of the
true fraction of liquidity-constrained. Hence my results are generally consistent
with the earlier conclusions based on the NLSY79 that credit constraints play only
a small role in determining the demand for education in the United States.
However, my subjective measures of financial difficulties reveal some im-
portant aspects of heterogeneity in the demand for education, not captured by the
standard socioeconomic variables. A comparison of educational outcomes across
a wide number of dimensions shows that the measure is internally consistent, at
least for men. Men who report constraints are less likely to enroll in college, more
likely to delay enrollment, and are less likely to graduate with a four-year degree
than their unconstrained counterparts. These differences are larger for youths at
the top of the ability distribution and persist when controls for parental income
and family background are introduced.
On a broader scale the results in this paper suggest that although self-
reported constraints need to be treated with caution, they can serve as a valuable
source of information regarding individual decision making. Subjective measures
allow researchers to observe additional aspects of population heterogeneity that
30
facilitate econometric analysis and reduce the need for arbitrary assumptions.
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Appendices
A.1 Survey Questions
Question S03D0766: Reason highest grade completed respondent expects is
less than respondent would like. What is the main reason that you expect to
complete less regular schooling than you would like to complete?
Table A-1: Distribution of Answers to Question S03D0766.
Men Women Difference
Answer N Percent N Percent T-stats.
Financial reasons 228 0.396 259 0.432 1.395
Family responsibilities 25 0.043 121 0.202 8.552***
School too difficult 38 0.066 16 0.027 3.195***
Have to work 114 0.198 66 0.110 4.149***
Health problems 1 0.002 0 0.000 1.015
Not necessary for job 27 0.047 19 0.032 1.311
Don’t like school 38 0.066 31 0.052 1.002
Other 105 0.182 87 0.145 2.129**
Total 576 1.000 599 1.000
A.2 The National Longitudinal Survey of YouthGeocodes Restricted-
Access Data Supplement
In this project, the Geocodes Restricted-Access data are used to identify state and
county of residence of the respondents at age 17. These data contain sensitive in-
formation that makes it possible to identify individual respondents. To ensure con-
fidentiality, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only grants access to Geocodes
data to researchers in the United States who agree in writing to adhere to the BLS
confidentiality policy. To gain access to the data, an application must be submitted
to the BLS describing the project’s goals, methodology, and security policies to
protect the data. After the application is approved, Geocodes data can be used to
conduct statistical analysis, but never to identify individual respondents.
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A.3 Higher Education General Information Survey Data
The Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) was designed to pro-
vide comprehensive information on various aspects of post-secondary education
in the United States. The study domain includes all post-secondary institutions
operating in the United States and its territories. The data used in this paper
come from the Institutional Characteristics module. The module contains an-
nual data on type of institution, tuition, location, and other characteristics of
colleges and universities in the United States. The study excluded federal in-
stitutions and colleges with enrollment of fewer than 100 students. The data are
available from University of Michigan data repository, and can be accessed at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/IAED-SERIES/00030.xml?token=6.
A.4 Additional Figures
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Figure A-2: Distribution of Credit Constraints by Parental Income and AFQT
Tercile, NLSY79. Expected Education – Some College.
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Figure A-3: Distribution of Credit Constraints by Parental Income and AFQT
Tercile, NLSY79. Expected Education – College Degree or Higher
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Figure A-4: Probability to Overpredict Education by Parental Income and AFQT
Tercile, NLSY79
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